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1  Introduction
Despite the right to freedom of trade as provided for in section 22 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the maxim pacta sunt 
servanda, which has been regarded as more important than the value of freedom 
to trade since the judgment in Magna Alloys v Ellis1 (“Magna Alloys”), is still 
given primacy in many court decisions. Several judgments after the advent of 
the Constitution merely confirmed the common law principles pertaining to 
agreements in restraint of trade and held that these were not in conflict with 
constitutional principles.2 In Magna Alloys the Appellate Division held that 
a contract in restraint of trade is enforceable like any other contract freely 
entered into, unless it is against public policy.3 The position in South African 
law following this case was thus that, unless the covenantor (employee) could 
prove that the terms of the restraint are unreasonable and against public policy, 
the restraint would be enforceable. This is in contrast to the position in English 
law (which was followed by South African courts up to the Magna Alloys case) 
in terms of which a contract in restraint of trade is regarded as against public 
policy and thus unenforceable, unless the covenantee (employer) proves that 
it is not unreasonable.4
Against this background, Davis J of the Cape High Court held in Advtech 
Resourcing Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn5 (“Advtech”) that 
the common law contract is now subject to constitutional rights and that the 
employer should thus bear the onus of proving that a contract in restraint of 
trade is reasonable.6
Later in 2008 the Durban High Court came to a completely opposite 
conclusion in Den Braven Ltd v Pillay7 (“Den Braven”). Wallis J held that 
section 22 has no direct application to contracts in restraint of trade, that 
Advtech was wrongly decided and that the enforceability of contracts in 
1 1984 4 SA 874 (A)
2 Walton’s Stationery Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie 1994 4 SA 507 (O) 513; Knox D’Arcy v Shaw 1996 2 SA 651 
(W) 661; Oasis Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bray 2006 4 All SA 183 (C) para 30
3 Magna Alloys v Ellis 1984 4 SA 874 (A) 893
4 Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Company Limited [1913] AC 724 733
5 2008 2 SA 375 (C)
6 Advtech Resourcing Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn 2008 2 SA 375 (C) para 28
7 2008 6 SA 229 (D)
       
restraint of trade should still be interpreted in terms of the principles laid 
down in Magna Alloys.8
This article will deal with these conflicting interpretations of the impact 
of the Constitution on agreements in restraint of trade as part of employment 
contracts. These opposing views call for the issue to be resolved by either the 
judiciary or legislator in the interests of clarity and certainty. There is support 
for both interpretations in cases decided before and after these judgments as 
will be discussed below. The need for a fundamental reconsideration of which 
principle should enjoy preference, namely pacta sunt servanda or freedom 
to trade in establishing public policy, as well as the connected issue of who 
should bear the onus, will be discussed.
2  The detrimental impact of Magna Alloys on employees
The English position that contracts in restraint of trade are against public 
policy and therefore prima facie void,9 was followed by South African courts, 
apparently without any analysis of whether there existed any basis for such 
a rule in the South African common law.10 In Magna Alloys the Appellate 
Division held that there was no rule in Roman-Dutch law to the effect that 
contracts in restraint of trade were unenforceable.11 The court’s decision is 
based on only two texts in regard to, firstly, an agreement between partners 
not to compete after dissolution of the partnership, and secondly, an agreement 
not to compete after the sale of a business. From these texts it is clear that 
the agreements were not regarded as prima facie invalid and that they were 
enforced by the Hooge Raad.12 Although these two cases do not concern 
restraint agreements in respect of employment contracts, the court in Magna 
Alloys clearly did not regard this as significant. The court also did not take the 
legal position on monopolies into consideration. In several texts it is clearly 
stated that monopolies infringing the freedom of trade in Roman-Dutch law 
were regarded as harmful.13 Restraints which were prejudicial to the public in 
this context were invalidated by the courts.14
The court in Magna Alloys accepted that the restraint agreements against 
the public interest will not be enforceable and that an unreasonable restraint 
(in regard to the interest to be protected) will usually be against the public 
interest.15 The court stated that it is in the public interest that persons honour 
their own agreements. The fact that an agreement is unreasonable or unfair 
8 Para 35
9 Nordenfelt v The Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC
10 Holmes v Goodall and Williams 1936 CPD 35 42; Super Safes (Pty) Ltd v Voulgarides 1975 2 SA 783 (W) 
785D-F
11 Magna Alloys v Ellis 1984 4 SA 874 (A) 890
12 890
13 JT Schoombee “Agreements in Restraint of Trade: The Appellate Division confirms New Principles” 
(1985) 48 THRHR 127 135
14 Even in Roman times the principal task of the provincial governor was to protect freedom of professional 
activity (A Wacke “Freedom of Trade and Clauses in Restraint of Trade in Roman and Modern Law” 
(1993) 11 Law and History Review 1 4)  Restraint of trades in the employment context arose in regard to a 
freed slave and his master  Roman law did not allow the master to place a restraint on competition of his 
former slave (Wacke (1993) Law and History Review 9)  
15 Magna Alloys v Ellis 1984 4 SA 874 (A) 893
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in regard to one of the parties will normally not provide any ground for 
challenging the validity of the agreement.16
The implication of the view that contracts in restraint of trade are prima 
facie enforceable is that the onus to prove that the agreement is unreasonable 
would henceforth in South African law (in contrast to English law) rest on the 
contracting party that wants to escape the clause. The court in Magna Alloys 
further held that, in contrast to English law, South African courts should 
take the time of enforcement of the contract as the relevant time for deciding 
whether enforcement would be in the public interest and therefore whether the 
restraint is reasonable. According to the court, it is logical and realistic that 
the court should be in a position to order that only part of the restraint should 
be enforced, if the court is to look at the circumstances at the time when 
enforcement is sought.17
The radical turnabout in Magna Alloys on established aspects of the 
restraint of trade law may be seen as part of the movement by South African 
courts to “purify” the South African legal system of English influences and 
to return to its Roman-Dutch roots.18 The implication of the judgment was 
that employees who were party to a restraint agreement were now in a weaker 
position than previously. The rules fundamental to the English doctrine were 
formulated to accommodate the unequal bargaining position of employees.19 
This dimension was lost with the changing of the rules in Magna Alloys,20 as 
the court did not distinguish between restraint clauses in general and those 
which are ancillary to employment contracts.
Other detrimental effects on employees21 were that the burden of proof 
that the restraint was unreasonable was now on the employee because of 
the primary position given to pacta sunt servanda. The court could also 
enforce that part of an overbroad restraint which is not detrimental to the 
public interest, in contrast to the position before Magna Alloys, when the strict 
“blue pencil” test22 was applied to severability of a restraint agreement. A 
further disadvantage was that the public interest was now the touchstone of 
reasonableness23 and that reasonableness inter partes would no longer be the 
main factor for the enforceability of a restraint.
3  The development of the test for reasonableness after 
Magna Alloys
The court in Magna Alloys did not give guidelines on how reasonableness 
is to be established and, as indicated above, placed emphasis on the public 
16 893
17 896
18 E Fagan “Roman-Dutch Law in its South African Historical Context” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) 
Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 33 60-64  
19 Nordenfeldt v The Maxim Nordenfeldt Guns 1894 A C  535 566:
   “[T]here is obviously more freedom of contract between buyer and seller than between master and 
servant or between an employer and a person seeking employment ”
20 Schoombee (1985) THRHR 140
21 134  
22 148
23 Magna Alloys v Ellis 1984 4 SA 874 (A) 892
52 STELL LR 2011 1
       
interest and not on reasonableness inter partes. The test for reasonableness 
was developed in the following way in Sunshine Records v Frohling:24
“[I]t is detrimental to society if an unreasonable fetter is placed on the person’s freedom to trade 
or to pursue a profession and that would in general be contrary to the public interest to enforce an 
unreasonable restriction on a person’s freedom to trade.”25
In Basson v Chilwan26 the court held that the following factors should be 
taken into account in deciding whether a restraint of trade is reasonable and 
consequently enforceable:
1. Is there an interest of the one party which is deserving of protection after 
termination of the agreement?
2. Is such interest being prejudiced by the other party?
3. If so, does such interest weigh qualitatively and quantitatively against 
the interest of the other party that the latter should not be economically 
inactive and unproductive?
4. Is there any other facet of public policy having nothing to do with the 
relationship between the parties but which requires that the restraint 
should either be maintained or rejected?27
This proportionality test, in which the interests of the employer and 
employee are balanced, has been followed by most courts in the post-Magna 
Alloys era. Courts have held that the restraint would be unreasonable if its 
only purpose is to eliminate competition.28 The employer must possess a 
protectable interest, which may include confidential information, trade secrets 
or trade connections.29 If the geographical area is too wide, or if the time during 
which the restraint would operate is too long, the restraint will be regarded 
as unreasonable.30 The focus is clearly on the interests of the employer and 
factors that could have an impact on the interests of the employee have seldom 
been taken into consideration.
4  Conflicting judgments on the impact of section 22
The principles laid down in Magna Alloys were followed by South African 
courts for close to two decades. The protection of freedom to trade in the 
Constitution raised questions about whether these principles were in conflict 
with the Constitution. Section 26 of the interim Constitution protects the right 
24 1990 4 SA 782 (A)
25 794C-E
26 1993 3 SA 742 (A) 767
27 “The use of gifts and bribes by the applicant to woo or maintain customers” was regarded as such a factor 
in Arrow Altech Distribution v Byrne 2008 29 ILJ 1391 (D) 1409 para 76
28 Basson v Chilwan 1993 3 SA 742 (A) 763; Sibex Engineering v Van Wyk 1991 4 SA 482 (T) 508
29 Recycling Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed 1981 3 SA 250 (SE) 258G-H; Basson v Chilwan 1993 3 SA 
742 (A) 769H; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 4 SA 482 (T) 509  
30 Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 4 SA 482 (T) 511
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to freely engage in economic activity31 and section 22 of the final Constitution 
provides that every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or 
profession freely32 (emphasis added).
Although section 22 of the final Constitution may be regarded as more 
limited33 than section 26 of the interim Constitution, Sutherland rightly argues 
that the most important aspect of freedom of trade is the freedom to work.34 It 
is clear that the right to choose a trade, occupation or profession also includes 
the right to practise the trade, occupation or profession. If not, the right to 
choose would be meaningless.
Several cases decided after the advent of the Constitution held that the 
Constitution had no influence on the common law as set out in Magna Alloys. 
In Knox D’Arcy v Shaw35 Van Schalkwyk J justified this view as follows:
“The Constitution does not take such a meddlesome interest in the private affairs of individuals that 
it would seek, as a matter of policy, to protect them against their own foolhardy or rash decisions … 
The provenance of the English rule that a contract in restraint of trade is prima facie unlawful refers 
back to a time when employees were inherently disadvantaged when striking a bargain with their 
employers … it is evident that the principle underlying English law has long since been overtaken 
by events and that there are now no reasons of public policy why an employee who voluntarily 
undertakes a restraint should be presumed to be at a disadvantage”.36
This view of a “passive” role of the Constitution reflects a philosophy of 
non-interference of public law with private contractual relationships and a 
disregard for the inequality of bargaining position of the employee which was 
prevalent in legal thinking when Magna Alloys was decided.37 The above 
reasoning that the Constitution had not altered the status quo and that restraint 
agreements in employment contracts should not be treated differently to other 
types of contracts was recently followed by Wallis J in Den Braven v Pillay.38 
The argument in these cases that employees are no longer in a disadvantaged 
position when contracting with the employer is not substantiated in any of 
these cases.
In contrast to the above cases, the influence of the Constitution on restraint 
agreements was acknowledged in several cases. In Coetzee v Comitis,39 
31 S 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 provides that:
   “(1)  Every person shall have the right freely to engage in economic activity and to pursue a livelihood 
anywhere in the national territory
   (2)  Subsection (1) shall not preclude measures designed to promote the protection or improvement 
of the quality of life, economic growth, human development, social justice, basic conditions 
of employment, fair labour practices or equal opportunity for all, provided such measures are 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality ”
32 S 22 of the final Constitution provides that:
   “Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely  The practice of a 
trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law ”
33 D Davis “Freedom of Trade, Occupation and Profession” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 2009 1) 54-1
34 PJ Sutherland The Restraint of Trade Doctrine in England, Scotland and South Africa PhD thesis 
Edinburgh (1997) 31
35 1996 2 SA 651 (W)  
36 659
37 Davis J refers to this approach as a libertarian view of the world in Advtech Resourcing (Pty) Ltd v Kuhn 
2008 2 SA 375 (C) para 31
38 Den Braven Ltd v Pillay 2008 6 SA 229 (D) para 27
39 2001 1 All SA 538 (C)  
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Traverso J considered the impact of the Constitution on public policy as 
follows:
“[C]onsiderations of public policy cannot be constant. Our society is an ever-changing one. We have 
moved from a very dark past into a democracy where the Constitution is the supreme law, and public 
policy should be considered against the background of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. One 
can think of many situations which would, prior to 1994, have been found not to offend public policy 
which would today be regarded as inhuman.”40
Traverso J held that the rules of the National Soccer League (“NSL”), 
which formed part of the contracts of soccer players, infringed the following 
rights of the players: freedom of movement, the right to choose a profession 
or occupation freely and the right to dignity. The court stated that the players 
were treated as “goods and chattels”41 in terms of a contract akin to a restraint 
of trade and that they had no freedom of contract. As the restraint infringed 
the constitutional rights of players, “the onus lies with the NSL to satisfy 
this Court that the compensation regime [part of the restraint contract] is a 
reasonable and justifiable limitation in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors.”42
The court in Coetzee v Comitis therefore found that the specific contract 
offended public policy as informed by the Constitution and also infringed 
specific constitutional rights of players. The party that wished to enforce the 
contract had to bear the onus of proving that it is a justifiable limitation in 
terms of section 36 of the Constitution.
In several cases decided after Coetzee v Comitis, the courts agreed with 
Traverso’s approach. In Lifeguards Africa v Raubenheimer,43 Tshabalala JP 
held that the onus should be on the employer where the constitutional right to 
freedom of trade of the employee is limited, but considered the court bound to 
Magna Alloys and Bridgestone, Firestone, Maxipriest Ltd v Taylor.44 In Canoa 
KwaZulu-Natal v Booth45 the Natal High Court also held that it is inconsistent 
with the Constitution to impose the onus to prove a constitutional protection 
on the employee.46 In Fidelity Guard Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Fidelity Guards v 
Pearmain,47 Liebenberg J stated that
“it seems that the position in terms of the Constitution may now be that the onus will be on the party 




43 2006 5 SA 364 (D&CLD)
44 2003 1 All SA 299 (N)
45 2004 1 BCLR 39 (N)
46 However, in Rectron (Pty) Ltd v Govender 2006 CLR 1 (D) the court found that the judgment in Canoa 
was clearly wrong on the ground that Kondile J had not considered the judgments delivered by the High 
Court in which it was held that the Constitution had no impact on the onus in restraint of trade agreement  
No analysis of the meaning of s 22 was made  The court in Rectron accordingly adhered to the principles 
laid down in Magna Alloys.
47 2001 2 SA 853 (SE)
48 862F-H
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Unfortunately the judge did not go further than this and did not make a 
decision on the matter as it was not necessary for the purposes of the specific 
judgment.
In Oasis Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bray49 the Cape High Court 
acknowledged that the court in two judgments, namely Coetzee v Comitis50 
and Canoa KwaZulu-Natal (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Office Automation v Booth,51 
held that section 22 of the Constitution had the effect that the onus of proving 
that a restraint should be enforced has now shifted to the employer. However, 
Dlodlo J considered the court to be bound to Magna Alloys.52
The above discussion indicates that there was disagreement in regard 
to whether the Constitution has an impact on the common law rule of the 
primacy of sanctity of contract as established by Magna Alloys and the 
concomitant rule that the employee bears the onus in restraint contracts. In 
some instances the High Court considered it bound to Magna Alloys by the 
rules of stare decisis and did not consider the possibility that the court could 
develop the common law rules which do not reflect constitutional values.53 
There was clearly a need for guidance from the Supreme Court of Appeal or 
the Constitutional Court.54
5  A golden opportunity missed in Reddy v Siemens
In Reddy v Siemens55 the SCA left open the question of the influence of 
section 22 on trade restraints. The court held that the onus issue would not 
have a bearing on the judgment, as all the evidence was before the court. What 
was called for was a value judgment:
“A court must make a value judgment with two principal policy considerations in mind in determining 
the reasonableness of a restraint. The first is that the public interest requires that parties should comply 
with their contractual obligations, a notion expressed by the maxim pacta servanda sunt. The second 
is that all persons should in the interests of society be productive and be permitted to engage in 
trade and commerce or the professions. Both considerations reflect not only common-law but also 
constitutional values. Contractual autonomy is part of freedom informing the constitutional value of 
dignity, and it is by entering into contracts that an individual takes part in economic life. In this sense 
freedom to contract is an integral part of the fundamental right referred to in s 22. Section 22 of the 
Constitution guarantees ‘[e]very citizen … the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession 
freely’ reflecting the closeness of the relationship between the freedom to choose a vocation and the 
nature of a society based on human dignity as contemplated by the Constitution. It is also an incident 
of the right to property to the extent that s 25 protects the acquisition, use, enjoyment and exploitation 
of property, and of the fundamental rights in respect of freedom of association (s 18), labour relations 
(s 23) and cultural, religious and linguistic communities (s 31).”56
49 2006 4 All SA 183 (C)
50 2001 1 All SA 538 (C)
51 2004 1 BCLR 39 (N)
52 Oasis Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bray 2006 4 All SA 183 (C) 195
53 See the exposition of Brand AJ in Afrox Healthcare v Strydom 2002 4 All SA 125 (SCA) paras 27-30  
The judge explains that if the High Court is convinced that a rule of the common law is in conflict with 
the Constitution, the court is obliged to deviate from the common law rule  However, if there is no direct 
conflict between the common law rule and the Constitution, the High Court is bound to the rules of stare 
decisis  
54 For a discussion of the tension between the principle of stare decisis and s 39(2) of the Constitution see 
MA du Plessis “Stare Decisis: Is the Onus in Restraint of Trade hanging on a Thread?” (2006) TSAR 423
55 (2007) 28 ILJ 317 (SCA)
56 Para 15  
56 STELL LR 2011 1
       
In spite of acknowledging the influence of the Constitution in the above 
paragraph and the balancing of the principles of pacta sunt servanda and 
freedom of trade, the court in Reddy added:
“Where the onus lies in a particular case is a consequence of the substantive law on the issue. I have 
pointed out that the substantive law in Magna Alloys is that a restraint is enforceable unless it is shown 
to be unreasonable, which necessarily casts an onus on the person who seeks to escape it.”57
The Supreme Court of Appeal was clearly reluctant to find that the South 
African trade restraint law had been changed by constitutional principles and 
preferred pacta sunt servanda as the primary value with the effect that the 
onus remains on the employee.
Neethling58 states that Malan J neatly avoided the question of onus by 
stating that since all the evidence was before the court, the incidence of the 
onus would not make a difference. Neethling himself also avoids the question 
by stating the following:
“It is submitted that this approach should be followed in similar circumstances in future, thus steering 
clear of the rather intricate question of whether the substantive law governing the burden of proof 
should be changed.”59
Why should courts steer away from this question? There is an urgent 
need for certainty, as indicated above. In an endeavour to answer the above 
question, the nature of pacta sunt servanda and freedom to trade will be 
analysed below.
The decision in Reddy was followed in Arrow Altech Distribution (Pty) Ltd 
v Byrne.60 In this case Nicholson J summarised restraint of trade law and 
stated that
“where the onus lies in a particular case is a consequence of the substantive law on the issue. What 
that calls for is a value judgment, rather than a determination of what facts have been proved, and the 
incidence of the onus accordingly plays no role.”61
Nicholson J apparently understood that Reddy held that the onus does not 
play a role any longer, while Reddy only held that it did not play a role in the 
particular case and, in fact, endorsed the view that the employee should bear 
the onus.
In Dickinson Holdings v Du Plessis62 (also following Reddy) it was accepted 
that the person who wants to escape the restraint clause in a contract had to 
prove that it was unreasonable and by implication that the Constitution had no 
influence on the onus.63 It is against this background of uncertainty about the 
constitutional impact on restraint agreements that the conflicting judgments 
of Davis J in Advtech v Kuhn64 and Wallis J in Den Braven v Pillay65 were 
57 Para 14
58 J Neethling “The Constitutional Impact on the Burden of Proof in Restraint of Trade Covenants – A Need 
for Exercising Restraint” (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 89 94  
59 94
60 2008 29 ILJ 1391
61 Para 4
62 2008 ILJ 1666  
63 Para 89
64 2008 2 SA 375 (C)
65 2008 6 SA 229 (D)  
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handed down. Davis J gave priority to the principle of freedom of trade and 
Wallis J gave priority to sanctity of contract.
6  The result of the unresolved disagreement: the battle of 
the judges
Davis J held in Advtech v Kuhn that the importance ascribed to the dignity 
of work66 supports the view that the onus should be on the employer to 
prove that the restraint is not unreasonable.67 The judge in effect held that 
the primary position of pacta sunt servanda in restraint agreements should 
now be occupied by the right to work, which is protected in section 22 of the 
Constitution.
The court in Advtech relied on the judgment of the Constitutional Court 
in Barkhuizen v Napier68 (“Barkhuizen”) to emphasise that in the post-
constitutional era contracts are subject to the Constitution.69 In Barkhuizen 
Ncgobo J emphasised the importance of pacta sunt servanda, but cautioned 
that contracts which are against public policy would never be enforced70 and 
that public policy in South Africa is now informed by the Constitution. Every 
contract may be examined to ensure that it is not against public policy. The court 
in Barkhuizen further stated that there are constitutional values embodied in 
the principle of contractual autonomy, namely the right to regulate one’s own 
life, which forms part of the constitutional rights to dignity and equality.71 
However, the judge cautioned that unequal bargaining relationships may have 
the implication that there is no contractual autonomy and had the insured in 
this case brought any evidence that he was in an unequal bargaining position, 
the court would have taken this into account.72 The judgment in Barkhuizen 
was criticised for not directly applying section 34 of the Constitution (the right 
to access to the courts) to the insurance contract in this case, but for using 
public policy, as informed by the Constitution, as a yardstick.73
In Den Braven v Pillay74 Wallis J emphasised that pacta sunt servanda is 
the economic life-blood of a civilised country and that the primacy of this 
principle as set out in Magna Alloys is still binding. The judge criticised Davis 
J’s statement in Advtech v Kuhn that adherence to pacta sunt servanda is 
an indication of a libertarian view of contractual relations.75 It is clear that 
Wallis J did not agree with the tenet of Davis J’s argument that adherence to 
pacta sunt servanda (without taking the influence of power relationships on 
consensus into account) is a reflection of the old view of laissez faire which 
previously allowed for complete freedom of contract, unless specifically 
regulated by statute. Wallis J held that there is no need to treat contracts in 
66 See Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 3 SA 247 (CC) para 59
67 Advtech Resourcing Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn 2008 2 SA 375 (C) para 28  





73 S Woolman “The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights” (2007) 4 SALJ 762 772
74 2008 6 SA 229 (D)
75 Para 31
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restraint of trade differently to any other contract as “problems that may arise 
from the disparate power relationships of the parties are dealt with in a variety 
of ways and particularly by legislation”.76 This view reflects the philosophical 
foundations of the judgments in Roffey v Catterall, Edwards & Goudré,77 
Magna Alloys v Ellis78 and Knox D’Arcy v Shaw,79 a case decided under the 
interim Constitution, but which adhered to the views of pre-constitutional 
cases. At this point it must be noted that there is no existing South African 
legislation protecting employees at the conclusion of a restraint in trade. This 
aspect will be discussed below.
Wallis J held that section 22 of the Constitution has no direct influence 
on restraint of trades as it does not have horizontal working.80 The judge 
based his argument on the second part of section 22, which provides that “the 
practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law”. He 
argued that this phrase indicates that the section only has vertical working. In 
the light of section 8 of the Constitution, this argument cannot be accepted, as 
there is nothing in the first part of the section that indicates that it should not 
be applicable to private parties. Furthermore, in Brisley v Drotsky81 the court 
had to decide whether section 26 of the final Constitution, which provides that 
no one may be evicted from their home, only had vertical working and came 
to the conclusion that although certain parts of the section are only applicable 
to the state, this is no reason why other parts of the section should not also be 
applicable to private parties.82
From the above and from cases decided after the Advtech and Den Braven 
cases, it is clear that there is a lack of certainty about whether the Constitution 
does have an influence on the common law principles applicable to restraints 
of trade and, if so, the extent of its influence.83 Guidance is needed on the 
question of whether pacta sunt servanda is still the primary value or whether 
it has now been replaced by the right to freedom to trade and, if so, how the 
common law should be developed to reflect constitutional values.
7  Two routes for developing the common law to give effect to 
section 22
In Khumalo v Holomisa84 the Constitutional Court held that section 8 
of the Constitution does have horizontal application and that it is therefore 
76 Para 33  
77 1977 4 SA 494 (N)
78 1984 4 SA 874 (A)
79 1996 2 SA 651 (W)
80 Rautenbach labels this approach “a deconstitutionalising of constitutional rights”  IM Rautenbach 
“Constitution and Contract – Exploring the Possibility that Certain Rights may apply directly to 
Contractual Terms or the Common Law that underlies Them” (2009) TSAR 613 625
81 2002 12 BCLR 1229 (SCA)  
82 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 12 BCLR 1229 (SCA) paras 39-42
83 In Random Logic (Pty) Ltd t/a Nashua Cape Town v Dempster 2009 30 ILJ 1762 (C) para 31, Bozalek J 
stated that
   “whether the employee’s s 22 right will play a more decisive role in the evaluation of the reasonableness 
of restraint of trade agreements through the direct route envisaged by Davis J in Advtech or through the 
vehicle of public policy remains to be seen ” 
84 2002 8 BCLR 771
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applicable to a dispute between private parties. In that case the Constitutional 
Court applied a provision of the Bill of Rights (freedom of expression) to the 
common law rule of defamation. The court held that if the common law of 
defamation did not give effect to the right to freedom of speech, the common 
law should be developed in terms of section 8(3) of the Constitution85 to give 
effect to the constitutional right.
However, in Barkhuizen v Napier Ncgobo J for the majority held that it 
was inappropriate to test a contractual clause against a constitutional right in 
terms of section 8. Direct application of a constitutional right to a contract was 
the route followed by the High Court in the same case. Ncgobo J criticised this 
mode of establishing whether there had been an infringement of a constitutional 
right and reasoned that the correct way of testing the constitutionality of a 
contractual clause is to establish whether the clause “goes against” the values 
embodied in the Constitution and then to develop the common law rules in 
line with section 39(2) of the Constitution:86
“In my view the proper approach to the constitutional challenges to contractual terms is to determine 
whether the term challenged is contrary to public policy as evidenced by the constitutional values, in 
particular those found in the Bill of Rights. This approach leaves space for the doctrine of Pacta sunt 
servanda to operate, but at the same time allows courts to decline to enforce contractual terms that 
are in conflict with the constitutional values even though the parties may have consented to them.”87
In his concurring judgment, Langa CJ was not convinced that section 8 
does not allow for the possibility that certain rights may apply directly to 
contractual terms. The above approach of Ngcobo J is also criticised by 
Woolman, who argues that this way of reasoning is a conflation of values, 
rights and public policy analysis.88 Sutherland is equally critical of the 
Constitutional Court’s approach and states that phrases used by Ngcobo J such 
as “constitutional values particularly those found in the Bill of Rights” are 
confusing and disrespectful of the Constitution and that this “demotes specific 
rights to the level of values.”89 Rautenbach views the reluctance of courts 
to apply constitutional rights directly to the law that underlies contractual 
terms as a resistance of private law individual autonomy to the influence of 
constitutional human rights.90
However, there is merit in the Constitutional Court’s criticism of the 
approach of the High Court which heard the matter in the first instance, with 
regard to the direct application of constitutional rights to the terms of a specific 
85 S 8(3) of the Constitution provides:
   “When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection 
(2), a court–
   (a)  in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to 
the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and
   (b)  may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in 
accordance with section 36 (1) ”
86 S 39(2) of the Constitution provides:
   “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights ”
87 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC) para 30
88 Woolman (2007) SALJ 772
89 PJ Sutherland “Ensuring Contractual Fairness in Consumer Contracts after Barkhuizen v Napier 1” 
(2008) 19 Stell LR 390 402
90 Rautenbach (2009) TSAR 617
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contract in terms of section 8.91 This approach of the High Court leads to 
difficulties, as a limitation of a constitutional right could only be justified 
in terms of section 36 of the Constitution, which provides that a right in the 
Constitution can only be limited by a law of general application. The terms of 
a specific contract cannot be regarded as “a law of general application”. The 
approach should be to test the law of contract, namely pacta sunt servanda, 
the common law rule in terms of which contracts are enforced, against the 
relevant constitutional right or rights.92 A common law rule could be seen 
as “a law of general application”. If this approach is applied to restraint of 
trade agreements, the common law rules of pacta sunt servanda particularly 
as applicable to restraint agreements (the test for reasonableness) should be 
tested against section 22 and other relevant constitutional rights.
Relying on the judgment in Holomisa, Davis J in Advtech v Kuhn argued 
that if it is found that the common law rule that the employee bears the onus in 
restraint of trade disputes limits constitutional rights impacting on the dignity 
to work, the common law should be developed in terms of section 8(3) of the 
Constitution to place the onus on the employer to prove that the limitation 
is constitutional.93 This approach of Davis J has considerable merit in that 
section 8(3)(a) of the Constitution provides that a court “in order to give effect 
to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to 
the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right”. Since restraint of 
trade clauses in employment contracts have not been regulated by legislation 
(unlike most other areas of labour law), it is submitted that it is necessary 
that the courts develop this area of labour law to give effect to constitutional 
values.
This argument could be strengthened by taking into consideration certain 
judgments in which the common law contract of employment was developed 
in such a manner to be deemed to contain an implied right to fairness. This 
line of cases started with Old Mutual v Gumbi,94 which was then followed 
inter alia by Boxer Superstores Mthatha v Mbenya,95 before culminating in 
Murray v Minister of Defence.96 In the latter case the court stated that
“the common law of employment must be held to impose on all employers a duty of fair dealing at 
all times with their employees.”97
However, in SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie98 the SCA held that 
where an employee is covered by the Labour Relations Act, there is no implied 
right of fair labour practices in such a person’s contract of employment. Despite 
this judgment, it could be argued that Murray is still good law in regard to 
persons or aspects of the employment relationship not covered by the LRA 
91 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC)
92 Sutherland (2008) Stell LR 399
93 Advtech Resourcing Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn 2008 2 SA 375 (C) para 28
94 2007 8 BLLR 699 (SCA)
95 2007 8 BLLR 693 (SCA)
96 2008 6 BLLR 513 (SCA)
97 Para 5
98 2010 5 BLLR 488 (SCA)
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and that since employment restraints are not covered by labour legislation, 
these contracts contain an implied right to fair dealing.
In the Advtech decision, Davis J further argued that the common law could, 
alternatively (to development in terms of section 8(3)(a) of the Constitution), 
be developed in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution (as was done in 
Barkhuizen v Napier), which mandates courts to develop the common law to 
reflect the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution.99 For a development 
of the law in terms of section 39(2), there is no need for a direct conflict 
between the common law rule and the constitutional right.
The approach of Traverso J in Coetzee v Comitis and that of Davis J in 
Advtech v Kuhn, in terms of which the Constitution is applied directly100 to 
a common law rule of contract, is to be preferred, as it acknowledges that 
entrenched rights are concretised rules of public policy. These rights should 
be enforceable and should not be dependent on a process of developing the 
common law to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution.
8  The demise of pacta sunt servanda
Courts in the pre-constitutional era held pacta sunt servanda in high 
regard as a profoundly moral principle and regarded sanctity of contract as 
more important than freedom to trade.101 This may be seen as a laissez faire 
approach according to which the most powerful party to the contract will get 
the best deal, as opposed to social intervention in terms of which the weaker 
party will be protected.102 In judgments on contracts in restraint of trade 
under the Constitution, several judgments held that sanctity of contract still 
holds primary place when weighed against freedom of trade in establishing 
the content of public policy.103
Ncgobo J in Barkhuizen v Napier described the inappropriateness of 
primacy of sanctity of contract in a post-constitutional era as follows:
“The doctrine of sanctity of contract and the maxim pacta sunt servanda have through judicial and 
text-book repetition come to appear axiomatic, indeed mesmeric, to many in the legal world. Their 
virtue if applied in an unlimited way is not self-evident and their reach if not their essence have come 
to be severely restricted in open and democratic societies … The jurisprudential pedestal on which it 
once imperiously stood has been singularly narrowed in the great majority of democratic societies. 
Our new constitutional order, I believe, further attenuates its one-time implacable application.”104
However, in several judgments (including Barkhuizen v Napier) handed 
down after the advent of the Constitution, pacta sunt servanda has been read 
into the right to freedom and dignity.105 The approach is that an individual’s 
contractual autonomy is part of the constitutional right to dignity.106 This 
99 Advtech Resourcing Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn 2008 2 SA 375 (C) paras 23-25
100 These cases also made provision that the common law could be developed in terms of s 39(2) of the 
Constitution
101 Roffey v Catterall, Edwards and Goudré (Pty) Ltd 1977 4 All SA 482 (N) 493
102 B du Plessis & DM Davis “Restraint of Trade and Public Policy” (1984) 86 SALJ 86 97
103 Knox D’Arcy v Shaw 1996 2 SA 651 (W) 661; Reddy v Siemens 2007 2 SA 486 (SCA) para 14.
104 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC) para 141
105 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC) para 57; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 12 BCLR 1229 (SCA) para 
7; Reddy v Siemens 2007 2 SA 486 (SCA) para 15  
106 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC) paras 30, 57
62 STELL LR 2011 1
       
approach elevates pacta sunt servanda to a constitutional right which can 
be balanced against other constitutionally protected rights while there is no 
explicit reference to contractual autonomy in the Bill of Rights.107 A deeper 
dimension of sanctity of contract in the restraint of trade context is that it 
protects the vested proprietary and commercial interests of the employer.108
Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier illustrated that it is particularly inappropriate 
to rely on sanctity of contract where standard form contracts are used. The 
judge argues that these documents cannot be seen as consensual and that it is 
surprising that courts in modern times have enforced “contracts” of this kind 
in the light of the importance of the element of consent in the classic contract 
law.109
9  The value protected by freedom to work
Section 22 of the Constitution provides that every citizen has the right 
to choose a trade, occupation or profession. The essence of this right is the 
freedom to earn a living by working. Sutherland points out that by using 
this terminology, the emphasis is placed where it should be, namely on the 
freedom to work.110
In the United Kingdom courts have often emphasised the high regard in that 
country for the liberty of a man to earn his living and the fact that the “public 
interest, which is always on the side of liberty, can be invoked to justify the 
non-enforcement of a restraint.”111 All interference with the individual liberty 
to trade was regarded as against public policy and therefore void.112 This was 
the position in South Africa until the decision in Magna Alloys replaced the 
value placed on the liberty to earn a living for sanctity of contract as discussed 
above.
In South African case law the freedom to work as a component of 
human dignity has been described as follows in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Watchenuka:113
“The freedom to engage in productive work – even where that is not required in order to survive – is 
indeed an important component of human dignity … for mankind is pre-eminently a social species 
with an instinct for meaningful association. Self-esteem and the sense of self-worth – the fulfilment of 
what it is to be human – is most often bound up with being accepted as socially useful.”114
In Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health115 the court stated that
“[w]hat is at stake is more than one’s right to earn a living, important though that is. Freedom to 
choose a vocation is intrinsic to the nature of a society based on human dignity as contemplated by the 
Constitution. One’s work is part of one’s identity and is constitutive of one’s dignity. Every individual 
has a right to take up any activity which he or she believes himself or herself prepared to undertake 
as a profession and to make that activity the very basis of his or her life. And there is a relationship 
107 Sutherland Restraint of Trade Doctrine 51-52
108 Du Plessis & Davis (1984) SALJ 97
109 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC) para 152
110 Sutherland Restraint of Trade Doctrine 31
111 Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Company Limited [1913] AC 724
112 Lord McNaghten in Nordenfelt v The Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC 565
113 2004 2 BCLR 120 (SCA)
114 Para 27
115 2005 6 BCLR 529 (CC)  
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between work and the human personality as a whole. It is a relationship that shapes and completes the 
individual over a lifetime of devoted activity; it is the foundation of a person’s existence.”116
The freedom to work is therefore an important human right as it is a means 
to maintain dignity and self-respect117 by providing for one’s own and one’s 
family’s upkeep; not to be dependent on anyone or the state; to take part in 
activities of society regarded to be to the benefit of society and thereby earn 
the respect of society;118 to express oneself and to develop the self.119
On the other hand, if a person is not able to work, this will lead to social 
exclusion120 because of poverty and the lack of social interaction inherent 
in a workplace. The person and their family would also most likely become 
dependent on the state or the community.
Section 22 of the Constitution, which protects the right to work, the 
importance of which is spelled out above, should furthermore not be interpreted 
in isolation. The rights to dignity (section 10), freedom of movement (section 
21), the right not to be subjected to forced labour (section 13), freedom of 
association (section 18), and the right to fair labour practices (section 23) 
should also be taken into consideration when the content of the right to freely 
choose a trade, occupation or profession is considered.
10  The inequality of the bargaining positions of parties
English courts have held that even if the contract was freely entered 
into, there is a difference between a restraint agreement in an employment 
contract and a restraint agreement in a contract for the sale of a business. Lord 
MacNaghten stated in the Nordenfelt case that
“there is obviously more freedom of contract between buyer and seller than between master and 
servant or between an employer and a person seeking employment.”121
Lord Shaw of Dunfermline agreed with this statement in Mason v Provident 
Clothing and stated that in his opinion
“there is much greater room for allowing, as between buyer and seller, a larger scope for freedom of 
contract and a correspondingly large restraint in freedom of trade, than there is for allowing a restraint 
of the opportunity for labour in a contract between master and servant or an employer and an applicant 
for work.”122
Regard for the unequal bargaining position of parties in employment 
contracts forms the basis for the disfavour with which covenants in restraint 
of trade are treated in many states in the USA.123 In a few states, notably 
116 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2005 6 BCLR 529 (CC) para 59
117 A van Niekerk, M Christianson, M McGregor, N Smit & S van Eck Law @ Work (2008) 3
118 Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka 2004 2 BCLR 120 (SCA) paras 26-27
119 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2005 6 BCLR 529 (CC) para 59  
120 H Collins, KD Ewing & A McColgan Labour Law Text and Materials (2005) 5  
121 Nordenfelt v The Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC 565
122 Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Company Limited [1913] AC 738
123 National Motor Club of La., Inc. v. Conque, 173 So  2d 238, 241 (La  Ct  App  3d Cir  1965) (Louisiana); 
Omniplex World Servs.Corp.v.US.Investigations Servs. Inc.,618 S E  2d 340, 342 (Virginia); J Boatman 
“Contract Law: As clear as Mud: The Demise of the Convenant not to compete in Oklahoma” (2002) 55 
Okla L Rev 491 506  
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California, this type of covenant is prohibited.124 In states where restraint 
agreements are not prohibited, the courts have taken a wide range of factors 
into consideration in establishing the reasonableness of the restraint.125
In Afrox Healthcare BP (Cape) v Strydom126 the South African Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that inequality of bargaining power is a factor that would 
be taken into consideration by courts in establishing the public interest.127 
In Barkhuizen v Napier Ngcobo J agreed with the principle that inequality 
of bargaining positions would have an influence on the enforceability of a 
contract and added that the constitutional values of equality and dignity may 
prove decisive.128
In Napier v Barkhuizen129 the Supreme Court of Appeal was willing to take 
the relative bargaining positions of the parties in an insurance contract into 
account in determining whether the contract was against public policy, but 
could not do so in the absence of evidence before the court:
“In the present case, the evidence is so scant that we can only speculate on the plaintiff’s bargaining 
position in relation to the insurer. This is because there was no evidence regarding the market in short-
term insurance products; whether a variety of such products is available; the number of suppliers, 
and their relative market share; whether all or most short-term insurers impose a time-bar; whether a 
diversity of time-limits is available to those seeking short-term insurance cover, and over what range 
they fall… All this would bear on the critical question, which is whether the plaintiff in effect was 
forced to contract with the insurer on terms that infringed his constitutional rights to dignity and 
equality in a way that requires this court to develop the common law of contract so as to invalidate the 
term. But without any inkling regarding the issues set out above, the broader constitutional challenge 
cannot even get off the ground.”130
The factors enumerated by the court are quoted in full to illustrate the 
factual detail that could play a role in indicating that parties are not in an equal 
bargaining position in the insurance context. By analogy to the above, factors 
that should be taken into account to establish whether a restraint agreement 
was voluntarily entered into are the following:
• the experience and skills or lack of experience and skills of the employee;
• the demand in the labour market for the employee’s skills;
• whether there is a high rate of unemployment;
• the state of the economy and the unemployment rate;
• personal circumstances such as family responsibilities that would place 
pressure on an employee in finding a job in a certain area; and
• the age of the employee (young people and people above 50 may find it 
more difficult to find employment).
124 K O’Neill “Should I stay or should I go? – Covenants not to compete in a Down Economy: A Proposal for 
Better Advocacy and Better Judicial Opinions” (2010) 6 Hastings Bus LJ 83 102  
125 In Nebraska in the USA the courts have taken into account factors such as the employee’s training, 
health, education, and needs of his family; the current conditions of employment; and the necessity of the 
employee changing his profession or residence in establishing the reasonableness of the restraint  Philip 
G. Johnson & Co. v. Salmen, 1982 211 Neb  123, 317 N W 2d 900, 904
126 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA)  
127 131  
128 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC) para 59
129 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA)
130 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 15-16 (emphasis added)
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The above factors could conveniently be grouped together under the concept 
of “economic dependence”, which was recently pointed out as one of the most 
important factors indicating that a person is an employee and not an independent 
contractor.131 The concept of economic dependence could also be used in the 
present context to indicate that an employee was economically dependent on the 
employer to such an extent that there was no real bargaining power and that there 
was therefore no choice for the employee but to agree to the particular restraint.
The concerns raised by Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier132 in regard to 
questions about real consensus in standard form contracts should also be 
taken into consideration. Often agreements in restraint of trade are drawn up 
by in-house lawyers, as an addendum to all employment contracts and not as 
a specific clause for a specific employee.133 The standard restraint agreement 
with many sub-clauses and legal jargon has to be signed by all employees, 
regardless of their position in the firm. The inequality in bargaining power 
and the absence of freedom of contract in such a situation is obvious.
The unequal bargaining position of employees was often denied by South 
African courts in pre-constitutional times,134 but also by courts delivering 
judgments after the advent of the Constitution.135 In these judgments it has 
been held that restraint agreements in employment contracts do not warrant 
any special treatment. Didcott J in Roffey v Catterall, Edwards & Goudré 
stated as follows:
“Economic development, industrial legislation, trade unionism, and other modern phenomena have so 
strengthened large categories of employees that their negotiating force is often equivalent or superior 
to that of their employers.”136
Wallis J in Den Braven, criticising Davis J’s judgment in Advtech v Kuhn 
that restraints of trade in employment contracts should be regarded in a 
different light after the advent of the Constitution, stated that:
“There appears to be a view that restraint of trade agreements justify special and separate treatment 
within our law of contract and that the existing state of our law requires reconsideration. The further 
impression left by all this is that there is in principle an objection to such agreements. If that is a 
correct reasoning on both grounds I am unable to share the learned judge’s view. The importance of 
the decision in Magna Alloys is that it removed restraint of trade agreements from being a special 
and isolated type of contract looked upon with particular approbation by the courts and placed them 
squarely within the mainstream of the law of contract as agreements concluded and enforceable in 
the ordinary course, but unenforceable where their enforcement would be in conflict with public 
policy”.137
This view of Wallis J may be appropriate in respect of restraint agreements 
concluded outside the employment context, but it is not appropriate for 
agreements concluded as part of an employment contract. The basis for 
labour law as a separate discipline is the acknowledgement of the fact that the 
131 State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration 
2008 29 ILJ 2234 (LAC) para 12  
132 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC) paras 123-175
133 Den Braven Ltd v Pillay 2008 6 SA 229 (D) para 30
134 Roffey v Catterall, Edwards and Goudré (Pty) Ltd 1977 4 All SA 482 (N) 487  
135 Knox D’Arcy v Shaw 1996 2 SA 651 (W) 659 ; Den Braven Ltd v Pillay 2008 6 SA 229 (D) para 27
136 Roffey v Catterall, Edwards & Goudré (Pty) Ltd 1977 4 All SA 482 (N) 487
137 Den Braven Ltd v Pillay 2008 6 SA 229 (D) para 35
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employees are in a subordinate position because of their inferior bargaining 
position.138 For this reason legislation establishes minimum conditions of 
work and regulates collective bargaining. By these measures labour legislation 
endeavours to place employers and employees in an equal bargaining position. 
Some employees may be in an equal bargaining position to their prospective 
employer at the conclusion of the contract, but highly skilled employees are 
the exception, especially in South Africa, where unemployment rates are 
well over 25%.139 Highly skilled employees will often receive some benefit 
(excluding simply being employed) as quid pro quo for agreeing to a restraint. 
If there is no quid pro quo (as is the usual position), this may be an indication 
of an unequal bargaining position.
Should the superior courts not develop the common law to take the unequal 
bargaining position of employees into account to give effect to the Constitution 
and in so doing protect employees, the legislator could solve the problem as 
was done in Germany.
11  The regulation of restraint clauses by legislation in Germany
Restraint clauses in Germany are in general not regarded as invalid, because 
of the principle of liberty to contract, which is protected in Article 2140 of the 
German Grundgesetz (Basic Law or Constitution). However, restraint clauses 
in employment contracts are strictly regulated by legislation in §§ 74-75f 
of the Handelsgeseztsbuch (HGB) read with § 110 of the Gewerbeordnung 
(GWO). Restraint clauses have to comply with the following requirements to be 
enforceable:
• the employer must have a protectable interest;141
• the clause must be in writing;142
• the duration of all restraints is limited to two years after the termination of 
the employment contract;143
• the employer has to pay half of the employee’s salary for each year that the 
restraint operates (bezahlte Karenzeit);144 and
• the courts will not enforce a restraint that causes unreasonable disadvantages 
for the employee in terms of the duration, geographical area and subject of 
competition.145
138 “[T]he relation between an employer and isolated employee or worker is typically a relation between a 
bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power  In its inception it is an act of submission, in its 
operation it is a condition of subordination, however much the submission and the subordination may be 
concealed by that indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the ‘contract of employment’  The main 
object of labour law has always been, and we venture to say will always be, to be a countervailing force to 
counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent and must be inherent in the employment 
relationship” (PL Davies & M Freedland Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) 18)
139 Statistics South Africa Quarterly Labour Force Survey (04-05-2010) 1 (January-March)
140 Article 2 makes provision for “personal freedoms”
141 § 74 a  I 1 HGB
142 § 74 I 1 HGB
143 § 74 a  I 3 HGB  
144 § 74 I I HGB
145 M Weiss & M Schmidt “Germany” in R Blanpain (ed) International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations 7 (RS 2010) para 337
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In the event of the court finding that the restraint is unenforceable 
because the agreement did not comply with the requirements set out above 
(for example a non-protectable interest), the employee still has the choice 
to adhere to the agreement and to be paid the agreed amount.146 If this is 
the employee’s choice, such employee is then obliged to refrain from taking 
up employment as specified in the restraint clause. The former employer is 
entitled to information about the new employer of its erstwhile employee, the 
scope of its business and the duties of the employee.147
Although the German Grundgesetz protects the right to freely choose 
an occupation in Article 12, the German courts do not have to rely on the 
Grundgesetz to ensure fairness, as the German legislator has given effect to 
the constitutional right to freely choose an occupation as discussed above. 
These rules ensure balance in a relationship which is often skewed as a result 
of the unequal bargaining positions of employers and employees.
Some of the requirements for valid restraint clauses in Germany are similar 
to the requirements for reasonableness inter partes in South African law. For 
instance, the employer must have a protectable interest and the restraint must 
not be unreasonable in regard to duration and geographical area. Payment 
of all employees (and not only highly skilled employees) will ensure that the 
employer does not lightly insist on a restraint. If the employer is required to 
pay 50% of the normal remuneration of the employee, this would seem to be 
fair to both the employer and employee. The employer is further protected in 
that the employee has to provide information on a new employer.
The above regulation of employment restraints in the German system could 
also be taken into account in developing the South African common law. In 
terms of section 39(1)(c) of the final Constitution, courts may consider foreign 
law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. When interpreting sections 22 and 
23 of the Constitution in the context of employment restraints, the measures 
taken by the German legislator could be considered as an example of how to 
ensure a more balanced relationship.
12  Conclusion
After the advent of the Constitution several judgments of the High Court 
favoured a new approach to restraint of trade clauses in employment contracts. 
In these judgments it was held that the Constitution, and especially section 22 
of the Constitution, has the effect that the common law position in terms of 
which the maxim pacta sunt servanda enjoys preference to freedom to trade 
has now been changed. According to these judgments, the burden to prove 
reasonableness of the restraint should in the light of the Constitution now rest 
on the employer.148 Conflicting judgments held that the common law position 
146 Decision of the Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG) 28 6 2006, AZR,407/25
147 BAG 22 4 1967, BGB §242 This paragraph deals with Treu und Glauben (performance in good faith) and 
provides as follows: “An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking 
customary practice into consideration”
148 Advtech Resourcing Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn 2008 2 SA 375 (C) para 28; Coetzee v 
Comitis 2001 1 All SA 538 (C) para 40  
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(as set out in Magna Alloys) is not in conflict with the Constitution and that the 
onus should therefore remain on the employee.149
The fact that the relationship between employee and employer is increasingly 
being regulated by legislation,150 is an acknowledgement of the fact that 
common law lawfulness alone is not sufficient to regulate the employment 
relationship. The contract of employment has at least since 1944 been regarded 
as a special kind of contract in terms of which man does not sell a commodity, 
but sells himself.151 The common law contract of employment still forms the 
basis of the employment relationship, but the freedom of contract of parties is 
limited to protect employees.
However, clauses in restraint of trade in employment contracts still lag 
behind in respect of protection afforded to employees. There is no legislation 
regulating these agreements and the unequal bargaining position of employees 
has not been taken sufficiently into consideration in judgments establishing 
the reasonableness of the restraint. Therefore, freedom to contract, which in 
some judgments is read into the constitutional right to dignity, still enjoys 
preference when balanced against freedom of trade. The rules of the common 
law, now generally regarded as inadequate to regulate the employment 
relationship, are left intact to regulate without interference a very important 
part of the employment contract.
In the light of the constitutional right to dignity, freedom of association, 
freedom of forced labour, freedom of movement, freedom to choose a trade 
and the right to fair labour practices, which could all be potentially limited 
by a restraint, the common law rules regulating restraint agreements in 
employment contracts should be amended to reflect these values.
To attain this, the courts could develop the common law applicable to 
restraint agreements in terms of section 8(3) of the Constitution.152 This 
would entail testing the common law rules pertaining to reasonableness of 
the restraint directly against section 22 and the other relevant rights in the 
Constitution.
Alternatively, in the light of the criticism of the Constitutional Court in 
Barkhuizen v Napier against this approach, the courts could develop the 
common law through the prism of public policy in terms of section 39(2) to 
reflect the values of the Constitution without directly testing the law of contract 
against a specific constitutional right. Should courts develop the common law 
test for reasonableness in terms of section 39(2), freedom to trade should – in 
the light of the value of freedom to work and the unequal bargaining position 
of employees – enjoy primacy instead of pacta sunt servanda. The effect of 
developing the common law either through section 39(2) or section 8(3) would 
then be that the onus to prove that the restraint is reasonable would shift from 
the employee to the employer.
149 Den Braven Ltd v Pillay 2008 6 SA 229 (D) para 35
150 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997; Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995  
151 International Labour Organisation (ILO) ILO Declaration of Philadelphia (1944) <http://www ilocarib
org tt/projects/cariblex/conventions_23 shtml> (accessed 06-05-2010)
152 Davis J in Advtech Resourcing Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn 2008 2 SA 375 (C) para 30, 
stated that both ss 8 and 39(2) could be conducive to revisiting the issue of restraint of trade
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Should the courts not give effect to section 22 and other constitutional 
rights impacting on restraint agreements, the legislator could alternatively 
bring relief. The German example could be a model for reform in South Africa 
and could add much needed protection to employees who are locked into 
unreasonable restraints, or employees who have to conclude unreasonable 
restraint agreements in order to secure employment.
SUMMARY
Clauses in restraint of trade in employment contracts still lag behind in respect of protection 
afforded to employees. There is no legislation regulating these agreements and the unequal bargaining 
position of employees has not been taken sufficiently into consideration in judgments establishing the 
reasonableness of the restraint. The rules of the common law, now generally regarded as inadequate to 
regulate the employment relationship, are left intact to regulate without interference a very important 
part of the employment contract.
In the light of the constitutional right to dignity, freedom to choose a trade and the right to fair 
labour practices, which could all be potentially limited by a restraint, the common law rules regulating 
restraint agreements in employment contracts should be amended to reflect these values.
To attain this, the courts could develop the common law applicable to restraint agreements in 
terms of section 8(3) of the Constitution. This would entail testing the common law rules pertaining to 
reasonableness of the restraint directly against section 22 of the Constitution.
Alternatively, in the light of the criticism of the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier against 
this approach, the courts could develop the common law through the prism of public policy in terms 
of section 39(2) to reflect the values of the Constitution without directly testing the law of contract 
against a specific constitutional right. Should courts develop the common law test for reasonableness 
in terms of section 39(2), freedom to trade should – in the light of the value of freedom to work and the 
unequal bargaining position of employees – enjoy primacy instead of pacta sunt servanda. The effect 
of developing the common law would then be that the onus to prove that the restraint is reasonable 
would shift from the employee to the employer.
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